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Inartful Drafting Does Not Necessarily a Void,
as Opposed to a Vague, Statute Make-Even
Under the First Amendment: The Eleventh
Circuit Applies Common Sense to "Common
Understanding" in Void-for-Vagueness
Challenges to Lobbying Regulations
SAMUEL A. TERILLIt
Language is inherently ambiguous. We experience the ambigu-
ity in the words we use, the sentences we utter, and in countless com-
munication breakdowns. One researcher says that for the 500 most
frequently used words in the English language, there are over 14,000
definitions. Take, for instance, the word "run." A sprinter can "run"
in a race. Yet, politicians "run" races but not exclusively with their
legs. Although a horse "runs" with legs, it uses four of them, whereas
sprinters use two. A woman can get a "run" in her hose, which is
troublesome, but having a "run" of cards is good. However, having a
"run" on a bank is bad. "Running" aground is not good at all for a
sailor, but a "run" with the wind can be exhilarating. To score a "run"
in baseball is different than a "run" in cricket. Hence we "run" into
the ambiguity of language at every turn, even with simple, everyday
words.'
INTRODUCTION
Language, unlike mathematics, is the means by which we express a
society's laws, and the process of writing legislation does little, if any-
thing, to eliminate the inherent ambiguity of language.2 Language is
malleable and open to interpretation. Sentences rarely resemble equa-
tions. At times a speaker may even appear to be directing his or her
language to one person or group, while he or she is also communicating
with and influencing another, albeit indirectly.3 Imprecise legislative
f Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Communication. State University of
New York at Albany, B.A., 1979; University of Michigan, J.D., 1982.
1. PHILLIP G. CLAMPIT, COMMUNICATING FOR MANAGERIAL EFFEcTIVENESs 24 (3d ed.
2005) (footnote omitted).
2. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983) ("[D]ue process does not require
'impossible standards' of clarity." (citing United States v. Petrillo, 332, U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947)));
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) ("Condemned to the use of words, we can
never expect mathematical certainty from our language.").
3. See William V. Luneberg, Anonymity and Its Dubious Relevance to the Constitutionality
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drafting, though perhaps inevitable in light of the realities of language,'
might lead potentially covered persons to claim confusion about the
law's scope, while also arguing a broad application not intended by the
legislature.5 The Eleventh Circuit faced these difficulties associated with
speech, especially speech seeking to influence-that is, lobby-govern-
ment officials, in Florida Ass'n of Professional Lobbyists v. Division of
Legislative Information Services of the Florida Office of Legislative Ser-
vices ("FAPLI v. Division").6 By rejecting the lobbyists' void-for-vague-
ness and related overbreadth challenges under the First Amendment, the
court declined to impose unnecessarily technical linguistic standards for
unwary legislators trying to maintain, or perhaps restore, pubic confi-
dence in government by demanding disclosure and limiting the influence
of money in government.7
The FAPLI v. Division decision and the related Florida lobbying
laws8 are noteworthy because, leaving aside a bit of harmlessly inartful
legislative drafting, the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning and linguistic res-
cue of the Florida laws show that a little legislative ambiguity need not
be fatal-constitutionally speaking-if courts read statutes as a whole
and apply the common understandings of the covered persons (e.g., lob-
byists and state officials) as opposed to the common understanding of
the average person plainly outside the scope of the relevant law. In fact,
a bit of such ambiguity may be just what the doctor ordered when tack-
ling a problem as pervasive and subtle as the influence of lobbyists.9 If
legislatures are to have a meaningful right of self-defense against the use
of wealth to influence government, then they have to be allowed to
address direct and indirect exercises of influence-even if the latter
involves a bit of vague writing. The Florida Legislature essentially
of Lobbying Disclosure Legislation, 19 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 69, 103 (2008) (discussing United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), and Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to
Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007), with regard to indirect lobbying of legislatures through
grassroots campaigns).
4. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 581 (1974) ("There are areas of human conduct
where, by the nature of the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot establish standards with
great precision.").
5. E.g., Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.6
(1982) (explaining the interrelationships between vagueness and overbreadth arguments in terms
of statutory ambiguity that can lead to both); see also Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75-85 (1960).
6. 525 F.3d 1073, 1075 (11 th Cir. 2008).
7. See id. at 1079-80.
8. See FLA. STAT. § 11.045 (2008); id. § 112.3215.
9. See generally United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 266-67 (1927) (accepting the term
"near" with its inherent ambiguity as constitutionally sufficient in a statute prohibiting fires in or
near publicly owned forest and similar property, particularly in light of the importance of
preventing forest fires).
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employed a little ambiguity to get at an ambiguous subject.'"
Although overbreadth and void-for-vagueness arguments often
appear in tandem," as happened in FAPLI v. Division,12 this Article
examines the Eleventh Circuit's void-for-vagueness ruling only and is so
limited because the issue of ambiguity lay at the heart of both argu-
ments. The FAPLI appellants argued that the Florida lobbying laws, by
virtue of their general definitions and structure, could not be understood
as a matter of common knowledge and also could not, therefore, be nar-
rowed to apply only to direct communications with covered state offi-
cials to influence state policy or legislation.' 3 Somewhat ironically, the
appellants complained of vague standards under a law aimed at indirect
as well as direct expenditures for lobbying as a way of maintaining their
own ability to use vague or indirect modes of influence upon or commu-
nication with government officials (i.e., by influencing government indi-
rectly through the public and press)." The overbreadth argument,
therefore, shared the same root as the void-for-vagueness challenge-
ambiguous language.
The decision in FAPLI v. Division demonstrates that the inherent
malleability of language does not necessarily render a particular sen-
tence or statute useless or constitute a violation of constitutional rights.' 5
The dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable ambiguity in
legislation is the oft-invoked void-for-vagueness doctrine, which is not
the same as simple vagueness or ambiguity. 6 To be void for vagueness
there must be something more. The doctrine does not guarantee either
mathematical precision or even particularly good, as opposed to passable
and contextually understandable, legislative drafting.' 7 If a litigant could
employ the vagueness doctrine to frustrate the legislature's purpose
every time a law used a word or clause capable of multiple, though per-
haps stretched, meanings, then the doctrine would be overused to the
point of meaninglessness. The limitations upon the doctrine actually
strengthen it and its role in the individual's due process rights-particu-
10. Fla. Ass'n of Prof I Lobbyists, 525 F.3d at 1080 ("We have made clear that the state has a
compelling interest 'in self-protection in the face of coordinated pressure campaigns' directed by
lobbyists." (quoting Fla. League of Prof'I Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 460-61 (1 1th
Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
11. See, e.g., Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
494-95 (1982).
12. 525 F.3d at 1078.
13. Initial Brief of Appellants at 31-38, Fla. Ass'n of Profl Lobbyists, 525 F.3d 1073 (No.
07-10435-BB), 2007 WL 1379347.
14. Id. at 34-35.
15. 525 F.3d at 1079-80.
16. See Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 n.6.
17. See James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Webster, Vagueness and the First
Amendment, 15 Am. J.L. & MED. 217, 218-20 (1989).
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larly when First Amendment rights are at stake.' 8
Context was the saving grace for the legislation in FAPLI v. Divi-
sion, and that context came from the statute as a whole and the common
understanding not of the common man, but of the common person cov-
ered by the new laws-state officials as well as lobbyists and their cli-
ents.' 9 In three sections this Article examines the decision in FAPLI v.
Division as a means of understanding the void-for-vagueness doctrine in
cases in which the statutory language under constitutional attack was
arguably vague in a general sense, but reasonably clear to members of
the specialized class of persons covered by the laws. First, the Article
briefly examines the history of the vagueness doctrine and the support
for a contextual analysis of statutory language that might otherwise
appear to be vague. Second, the Article examines the Florida statutory
provisions in question and the challenges brought by the lobbyists in
FAPLI v. Division. Third, the Article examines the holding of the Elev-
enth Circuit and its analysis and application of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine.
The Article concludes that the court correctly took into account the
context of the lobbying laws as a whole, including all sections of the acts
as well as the fact that the statutory standards were "explicit . . . for
those who [would] apply them," while giving people of ordinary intelli-
gence a reasonable chance to know what conduct was covered.2° The
fact that the court rejected the vagueness challenge while also rejecting
an overbreadth challenge and reaffirming a previous ruling recognizing
the state's compelling interest in self-protection against lobbying pres-
sure21 signals a general receptiveness to such lobbying regulations, even
if written without mathematical precision.
I. THE CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO VOID-FOR-
VAGUENESS CHALLENGES
The void-for-vagueness doctrine fills the void between the art of
language and the precision of mathematics in legislative interpretation.
If language is naturally susceptible to some ambiguity, courts must ask
when the line is crossed between that which is constitutionally accept-
able and that which is not.22 Obviously, not every ambiguity is cause for
judicial rejection of a statute. 23 The void-for-vagueness doctrine arose in
18. See United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008).
19. See Fla. Ass'n of Prof'l Lobbyists, 525 F.3d at 1080.
20. Id. at 1079.
21. Id. at 1080.
22. See, e.g., Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830.
23. Id.
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the context of criminal statutes, and it has been regularly cited as a key
defense of liberty against laws written so vaguely that one would have
no fair notice of what was prohibited and no defense against purely arbi-
trary application of the law by government officials.24
Not all Supreme Court decisions addressing the doctrine have been
consistent with one another or even entirely clear about the doctrine's
limits and defenses.2 While its importance in the context of criminal
prosecutions is undisputed, the doctrine has extraordinary importance in
cases involving laws and prosecutions limiting a person's exercise of
fundamental liberties, such as the rights protected by the First Amend-
ment.26 A short review of the development of the doctrine is instructive
because it reveals some tension between the urge to subject statutes to a
searching and narrow-almost grammatically stringent-analysis of
statutory language and a looser, contextual approach that gives a legisla-
ture a bit more leeway. By demanding the former, one is searching for
the comfort that comes from certitude and the denial of discretion. By
using the latter, one seeks to empower the legislature at the risk of
greater discretion on the part of enforcement authorities and less notice
to covered persons. The history of the doctrine shows that neither
approach has ever been entirely ascendant because each has those obvi-
ous advantages and disadvantages.
Among the early Supreme Court invocations of the void-for-vague-
ness doctrine as a means of protecting individual liberty is the Court's
decision in United States v. Reese.2 7 In this 1875 decision, the Court
focused on two interests: fair notice and the separation of powers
between the legislative and judicial branches.2 8 In the context of a fed-
eral prosecution of two Kentucky elections officials who refused to
count the vote of an African American citizen, the Supreme Court
24. See Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 280 (2003); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and
the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 189, 196-197 (1985); Note, supra note 5,
at 75.
25. Goldsmith, supra note 24, at 281.
26. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
27. 92 U.S. 214 (1875). This decision is thought to be the earliest use of the void-for-
vagueness doctrine- though not by that specific name-by the Supreme Court. Goldsmith, supra
note 24, at 280 n. 1. However, an earlier case, to which the Court in Reese cites, actually dealt with
questions of arguments regarding legislative ambiguity and the construction of law based on both
legislative intent as well as a statute taken as a whole. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 76, 105 (1820). The logic employed in this earlier case is worth examining because, while
it did not involve in a constitutional challenge to the statute, it did involve the attempted creation
of an ambiguity based on legislative intent to change the scope of a criminal law, an attempt
rejected by the Court because to the degree such intent may have existed, it contradicted the
otherwise plain language of the statute. Id. Interestingly, the Court in Wiltberger examined the
entire statute as a means of interpreting sections of it in context. See id. 93-105.
28. Reese, 92 U.S. at 220-21.
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trumpeted the importance of fair notice regarding what conduct was
prohibited:
If the legislature undertakes to define by statute a new offence, and
provide for its punishment, it should express its will in language that
need not deceive the common mind. Every man should be able to
know with certainty when he is committing a crime. 29
The Court also declined to impose a limiting construction on the statute
so generally written because that "would, to some extent, substitute the
judicial for the legislative department"3 and would be tantamount to the
creation of new law by the Court, not enforcement of a law.
The Court in Reese was construing a "penal" statute-one that
could be used to take away a person's liberty-and thus one might
expect little tolerance for ambiguity in drafting. Judicial insistence upon
fair notice and the avoidance of statutes with double meanings would
seem quite unobjectionable. But this early, significant decision invoking
notice as a value deserves a closer look. The Kentucky elections inspec-
tors were charged under a federal law intended by Congress to address
the denial of the vote to African Americans during the Reconstruction
Era and under the Fifteenth Amendment.3' The problem for the Court
was that two sections of that statute made no mention of limiting the
scope of the prohibited conduct to violations based on race, color, or
prior servitude-the authorized bases for such federal laws under the
Fifteenth Amendment.3 ' The inspectors were prosecuted under those
two sections.33 Other sections of the statute, including a statement of
congressional intent, specifically referred to violations on the basis of a
voter's race, color, or prior servitude,34 but the Court narrowly construed
the sections authorizing punishment to avoid use of such general lan-
guage in ways not authorized by the Constitution and not intended by
Congress .
One could argue, as the dissent essentially did,36 that this interpre-
tation, while arguably laudable for its concern for liberty and precise
laws, was actually quite crabbed, perhaps even hostile to civil rights for
African Americans, and overly concerned with the technical issues of
drafting-issues that could have been resolved through judicial con-
struction in light of the clear intent of Congress and the other sections of
29. Id. at 220.
30. Id. at 221.
31. See id. at 216-18.
32. Id. at 216-17.
33. Id. at 215.
34. Id. at 216.
35. Id. at 219.
36. See id. at 256 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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the same law. As unfortunate as the result may have been, the motiva-
tion behind the majority's decision need not be determined to understand
that the decision might support technical and narrow linguistic analyses
to defeat statutes for which the intent and aim of the legislature were
clear, though not well expressed.
The Court's concern for formal separation of powers declined in
emphasis in later cases as the risk of arbitrary enforcement decisions
under vaguely written statutes became a key concern. 37 With this transi-
tion, the Court began taking a more conscious and open look at subsec-
tions of statutes in the context of the statute as a whole. In Grayned v.
City of Rockford, for example, the Court addressed an anti-noise ordi-
nance that provided city officials (including the local police) with some
degree of flexibility to protect local schools from diversionary noises
made from an "adjacent" location while school was in session.38 The
Court concluded that it was "clear what the ordinance as a whole pro-
hibit[ed] '39 and thus rejected the void-for-vagueness challenge.4" The
Court acknowledged the need to examine the law for any "broad invita-
tion to subjective or discriminatory enforcement," but found none given
the language of the statute as a whole and concluded that the statute had
"given fair warning as to what is prohibited."'4' The fact that this anti-
noise statute specifically dealt with a concrete, factual, and easily under-
stood real-world setting or context (i.e., noise near a school in session)
allowed the Court to easily distinguish it from more general anti-noise or
preservation-of-the-peace statutes that might be applied in any number
of unforeseeable settings.42 In other words, the Court in Grayned con-
cluded that context counts-both in terms of fair warning to covered
persons and fair limits upon enforcement discretion.
The importance of context became even clearer with two cases that
followed Grayned, though the fact that a sufficient context was held to
be lacking in those cases led the Court to strike down the subject statutes
as impermissibly vague. In Smith v. Goguen, the Court struck a Massa-
chusetts flag-abuse statute that imposed criminal sanctions on anyone
who "publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces or treats contemptu-
ously the flag of the United States."43 The Court noted that in light of
"today's tendencies to treat the flag unceremoniously," the notice or
fair-warning standard was not satisfied, but the Court added that even
37. Goldsmith, supra note 24, at 284-88.
38. 408 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1972).
39. Id. at 110.
40. Id. at 114.
41. Id. at 113-14.
42. Id. at 110-12.
43. 415 U.S. 566, 569 n.3 (1974).
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more troubling was the lack of any standards for enforcement that might
avoid pursuit by police, prosecutors, and juries of their "personal predi-
lections."" In so doing the Court acknowledged a key difference in
terms of context:
We recognize that in a noncommercial context behavior as a general
rule is not mapped out in advance on the basis of statutory language.
In such cases, perhaps the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness
doctrine is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the
doctrine-the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guide-
lines to govern law enforcement. It is in this regard that the statutory
language under scrutiny has its most notable deficiencies.45
The Court further emphasized the importance of context and the
risk of arbitrary enforcement nearly ten years later in Kolender v. Law-
son, a case striking a California disorderly conduct law providing that
any person "[w]ho loiters . . . without apparent reason or business and
who refuses to identify himself and to account for his presence when
requested by any peace officer so to do, if the surrounding circumstances
are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety
demands such identification."46 The Court also noted that, as construed
by the California courts, the state law also required that an individual
produce "credible and reliable" identification when requested by the
police officer.4 7 The Court held that, although due process did not
require absolute clarity, this statute could have been written more pre-
cisely and had to be so written because it did not allow merely for some
inevitable discretion in enforcement decisions, but actually
"encourage[d] arbitrary enforcement by failing to describe with suffi-
cient particularity what a suspect must do in order to satisfy the
statute.
48
The Kolender decision essentially rested on the lack of any context
in the statute. One could not argue that in the context of loiterers and
police there was any common understanding of what credible identifica-
tion meant. Without definitions, even poorly written definitions, the stat-
44. Id. at 574-75.
45. Id. at 574 (footnote omitted).
46. 461 U.S. 352, 353 n.i (1983) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West 1970)).
47. Id. at 359-60.
48. Id. at 361; see also United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947) (recognizing that
while the Constitution "erected procedural safeguards to protect against conviction for crime
except for violation of laws which have clearly defined conduct thereafter to be punished" it "does
not require impossible standards"); Precious Metals Assocs., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 620 F.2d 900, 907 (1st Cir. 1980) (noting that "language of proscription is not deficient
if it 'conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practices"' (quoting Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32
(1951))).
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ute left law enforcement officials with no standards for deciding whether
a suspect had complied with the identification requirement and thus not
only failed to inform suspects of what was necessary, but also
encouraged officers to make their own law on the spot.4 9
The conscious and open consideration of statutory context rejects
hypertechnical or overly parsimonious approaches to meaning and lan-
guage. In Hill v. Colorado, for example, the Supreme Court specifically
decried the proffered "hypertechnical theories" about the potential inter-
pretations of a state statute making it unlawful for any person within 100
feet of a health-care facility's entrance to approach, knowingly and with-
out consent, within eight feet of a person to hand out a leaflet, display a
sign, or speak with that person to protest, counsel, or educate that per-
son.5° Instead the Court looked at the statute as a whole to gauge the
clarity or fair notice of its prohibitions "in the vast majority of its
intended applications" and its guidance to law enforcement authorities.5
The Court concluded that, while one could imagine various hypothetical
problems, the scienter requirement and specificity of the statute left little
risk of a misunderstanding of "any of those common words" or unrea-
sonable exercises of judgment by police.52
The concern for common understanding by ordinary citizens makes
a great deal of sense when evaluating a penal law of general application
to ordinary persons. 53 Statutes relevant to a particular subset of the gen-
eral population should be judged, however, according to the understand-
ing common of members of that subset (e.g., profession or trade)
because it is the meaning understood by those persons that will be rele-
vant.54 The danger of placing too much emphasis on common under-
standing and common terms is that it can invite general vagueness
arguments in specialized contexts.5 5 Although the common understand-
ing is the form of the standard employed by courts in many cases, those
cases are in fact cases involving common words and common applica-
tion.56 With statutes aimed at more specialized settings, such as com-
49. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 360-61.
50. 530 U.S. 703, 707-08, 733 (2000).
51. Id. at 733 (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 23 (1960)).
52. Id. at 732-33.
53. See Jeffries, supra note 24, at 205-12.
54. See, e.g., Go Leasing, Inc. v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 800 F.2d 1514, 1525 (9th Cir.
1986) (discussing federal commercial aircraft leasing regulations); United States ex rel. Shott v.
Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 197-98 (6th Cir. 1966) (referring to common commercial practices in
securities industry); Empire State Rest. & Tavern Ass'n v. New York, 360 F. Supp. 2d 454,
460-62 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing smoking regulations in commercial context of bars and
food-service establishments).
55. See, e.g., Initial Brief of Appellants, supra note 13, at 33-35.
56. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1972) (discussing the subject of
noise and disturbances near a school-a matter of common interpretation and application).
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mercial or business dealings, the relevant common understanding is not
that of the common person generally, but that of the common person
involved in such specialized matters. In analyzing these statutes for
vagueness defects, therefore, the context is logically different. The
Supreme Court addressed this issue in an almost off-handed manner
when it rejected a vagueness challenge against a Maryland law against
certain business activities on Sundays: "We believe that business people
of ordinary intelligence in the position of appellants' employer would be
able to know what exceptions are encompassed by the statute either as a
matter of ordinary commercial knowledge or by simply making a rea-
sonable investigation."57 Therefore, three threshold questions must be
asked in evaluating vagueness challenges against specialized statutes:
(1) Who are the covered persons under the statute (as well as the rele-
vant enforcement authorities); (2) would the covered persons and rele-
vant enforcement authorities know who is whom; and (3) would both
covered persons and enforcement authorities, with their specialized
knowledge, understand the statute so that covered persons had fair warn-
ing and enforcement authorities adequate guidance?
II. FLORIDA'S 2005 LEGISLATION AND THE LOBBYISTS'
FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE
The desire of some progressive legislators and reformers to adopt
rules requiring disclosure and limiting certain forms of conduct and
expenditures for lobbying has led to a multiplicity of state regulatory
statutes as well as legal challenges.58 Florida reentered the fray when, in
a special legislative session in December 2005, the legislature passed,
and governor ultimately signed, Chapter 2005-359, later codified as sec-
tions 11.045 and 112.3215 of the Florida Statutes. 59 The two laws sub-
stantially increased the disclosure or reporting requirements applicable
to lobbyists and prohibited payments (defined precisely) by lobbyists to
any member or employee of the legislature as well as any agency offi-
cials, employees, or members of the executive branch. 60 The two laws
drew swift challenges by lobbying interests in Florida.61
57. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 428 (1961).
58. See, e.g., Steve Goldstein, Lobbying Laws Are Stricter at the State Level, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Mar. 3, 2006, at A6; James C. McKinley, Jr., Albany Looks Again at Lobbyist
Disclosure Rules, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2003, at B6; Lucy Morgan, Florida Rules for Lobbyists
Flunk, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 13, 2005, at IA.
59, See Fla. Ass'n of Prof'l Lobbyists v. Div. of Legislative Info. Servs., 525 F.3d 1073, 1075
(1 th Cir. 2008).
60. See Lucy Morgan & Connie Humburg, Price of Sway in Capital: $200M, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 25, 2007, at IA (reflecting on the impact of the Act and 2006 lobbying
fees in the aggregate).
61. See Steve Bousquet, Dutch Treat or a Trick?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, at
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To understand the heart of FAPLI's void-for-vagueness argument
the place to begin is, quite naturally, the language of the two statutes.
The difference between the two is essentially a question of applicability:
Section 11.045 applies to legislative lobbying activities,62 and section
112.3215 applies to executive lobbying activities.63 The substantive pro-
visions and language of the two are otherwise essentially the same. The
primary elements under constitutional attack included the expenditure
prohibition, essentially a rule against lobbyists giving anything of value
to the covered state officials for lobbying purposes,64 and the disclosure
rule, requiring annual compensation reports by lobbying firms showing,
among other things, the amount paid to the firm by each principal (i.e.,
client) as well as any relevant subcontractual relationships.65
Five key statutory definitions must be examined closely to under-
stand the prohibition of payments by lobbyists to legislators (or other
state legislative or executive employees) as well as the disclosure
requirements. First, there are two fundamental and basically parallel def-
initions related to the money or value the legislature sought to reach.
Both laws define "compensation" as "a payment, distribution, loan,
advance, reimbursement, deposit, salary, fee, retainer, or anything of
value provided or owed to a lobbying firm, directly or indirectly, by a
principal for any lobbying activity. 66 Both laws define "expenditure" as
"a payment, distribution, loan, advance, reimbursement, deposit, or any-
thing of value made by a lobbyist or principal for the purpose of lobby-
ing."' 67 The definitions exclude certain political contributions covered by
other laws and related matters. If one thinks of lobbying as a closed
system, the former addresses value flowing to the lobbyist from the cli-
ent and the latter addresses money, perhaps of the same origin, flowing
from either the client or the lobbyist to a third party to accomplish the
aims of the lobbying effort. The references in each definition to lobbying
effort or activity effectively limited the scope and applicability of the
laws to what the legislature was trying to address: influence accom-
plished through lobbying.
Second, the two laws define the activity at issue, but do so some-
1P; Lucy Morgan, Haggling Ahead on Lobbyist Reporting, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 31,
2005, at 6B; Lucy Morgan, Lobbyists Fume over Portions of New Rules, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
May 5, 2005, at 5B.
62. FLA. STAT. § 11.045 (2008).
63. Id. § 112.3215.
64. Id. §§ 11.045(4)(a), 112.3215(6)(a).
65. Id. §§ 11.045(3)(a), 112.3215(5)(a).
66. Id. §§ 11.045(1)(b), 112.3215(1)(c).
67. Id. §§ 11.045(1)(d), 112.3215(1)(d).
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what differently. The law aimed at lobbying of executive branch offi-
cials defines "lobbies" as follows:
"Lobbies" means seeking, on behalf of another person, to influence
an agency with respect to a decision of the agency in the area of
policy or procurement or an attempt to obtain the goodwill of an
agency official or employee. "Lobbies" also means influencing or
attempting to influence, on behalf of another, the Constitution Revi-
sion Commission's action or nonaction through oral or written com-
munication or an attempt to obtain the goodwill of a member or
employee of the Constitution Revision Commission.68
The operative language here is not merely the use of "influence," but the
fact that the effort to influence or obtain goodwill must occur "on behalf
of another person" and not merely on behalf of oneself. The law aimed
at lobbying before the legislature does not define "lobbies," but defines
"lobbying" instead: "'Lobbying' means influencing or attempting to
influence legislative action or nonaction through oral or written commu-
nication or an attempt to obtain the goodwill of a member or employee
of the Legislature."69 This language does not limit the activity to that
which is performed on behalf of another person, but the definition of
"lobbyist" does so.70 Of particular interest in the definition of "lobby-
ing" in section 11.045 is the reference to "an attempt to obtain the good-
will" of the covered officials because this language reflects a concern
broader than communications. The sentences are not models of clarity,
but a logical construction would designate "an attempt to obtain good-
will" as an alternative covered act of influence-that is, an act in addi-
tion to covered communications.
Third, the laws define the covered actors. The section dealing with
the executive branch defines "lobbyist" as "a person who is employed
and receives payment, or who contracts for economic consideration, for
the purpose of lobbying, or a person who is principally employed for
governmental affairs by another person or governmental entity to lobby
on behalf of that other person or government entity."'" This definition
continues by excluding from its scope attorneys representing clients in
judicial or formal administrative proceedings, confidential informants,
government employees acting in the normal course of their positions,
and certain people involved in specified contract procurement matters.72
The parallel section aimed at lobbying before the legislature is the same
68. Id. § 112.3215(i)(f).
69. Id. § 11.045(1)(f).
70. Id. § 11.045(1)(h).
71. Id. § 112.3215(i)(h).
72. Id.
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but does not exclude attorneys, as does the preceding section.73 Both
laws define a "lobbying firm" to be a "business entity, including an indi-
vidual contract lobbyist, that receives or becomes entitled to receive any
compensation for the purpose of lobbying, where any partner, owner,
officer, or employee of the business entity is a lobbyist. '74 Both define
"principal" as "the person, firm, corporation, or other entity which has
employed or retained a lobbyist. '7 5 The executive branch law adds a
qualifier to its definition of the covered agency officials or employees of
the state by limiting applicability to those required by law to file public
financial disclosure forms.76
In addition to requiring registration of lobbyists, establishing regis-
tration fees, providing for audits, and specifying fines and complaint
procedures, 77 the laws allow for the adoption of additional rules by the
respective chambers in the case of the legislature or by the Commission
on Ethics in the case of the executive branch officials.78 At the heart of
both laws is the required disclosure of payments to lobbying firms for
lobbying and the effort to cut off the flow of money or anything of value
from lobbyists and principals to the covered officials. Lobbying firms
file quarterly reports showing lobbying "compensation"-in total and by
individually identified principals.79 While the ambiguities, if any, in
terms of the disclosure requirement largely relate to the above defini-
tions and not any additional operative language requiring disclosure, the
same cannot be said for expenditure prohibitions. Section
112.3215(6)(a), for example, states, "[n]otwithstanding s. 112.3148, s.
112.3149, or any other provision of law to the contrary, no lobbyist or
principal shall make, directly or indirectly, and no agency official, mem-
ber, or employee shall knowingly accept, directly or indirectly, any
expenditure."8° A model of linguistic clarity this sentence is not. Obvi-
ously, word order matters in terms of clarity to the reader. An ordinary
person, perhaps one not involved in governmental affairs or the business
of lobbying or being lobbied, might wonder if this language means that
no lobbyist or principal can spend any money to lobby at all, whether
73. Id. § 11.045(l)(h).
74. Id. §§ 11.045(1)(g), 112.3215(l)(g).
75. Id. §§ 11.045(l)(i), 112.3215(1)(i).
76. Id. § 112.3215(l)(b).
77. Id. §§ 11.045(3), (5)-(9); 112.3215(7)-(14).
78. E.g., id. §§ 11.045(3), 11.045(6), 11.045(7), 112.3215(5)(d), (14).
79. Id. §§ 11.045(3)(a), 112.3215(5)(a).
80. Id. § 112.3215(6)(a). The language in the parallel provision covering lobbying before the
legislature is the same but with one caveat allowing members and employees of the legislature to
accept "floral arrangements or other celebratory items given to legislators and displayed in
chambers the opening day of a regular session." Id. § 11.045(4)(a). Apparently, opening day is a
cause for celebration for some people, particularly florists or their lobbyists.
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paid to an agency official or not, and also means, as a separate matter,
that no agency official may knowingly accept such money. The latter
application would seem unobjectionable in light of the law's purpose,
while the former would seem quite extreme, if not absurd, in light of the
fact that nothing in the law purports to make lobbying illegal-a pro-
position that would result in an immediate and serious constitutional
challenge. If one were to interpret the use of the conjunctive "and" to
mean that a lobbyist or principal could not make any expenditure for the
purpose of lobbying, whether or not those expenditures were paid to and
accepted by government officials, then that interpretation would amount
to a virtual prohibition of lobbying activity. No one has seriously sug-
gested the Florida Legislature intended such an extreme result. One
could easily imagine an elementary school language arts teacher insist-
ing her or his students revise the sentence and practice a bit more if they
wanted to pass the class, not to mention Florida's Comprehensive
Assessment Test (FCAT).8'
The expenditure sections could have been improved by at least
being more specific. For example, the legislature could have written that
no lobbyist or principal shall make or offer, directly or indirectly, any
expenditure to any agency official, member, or employee, and no agency
official, member, or employee shall knowingly solicit or accept, directly
or indirectly, any expenditure. Admittedly, this revision also tackles the
possible question of attempts, but with or without those additional
words, it would have cleaned up the ambiguity left hanging in what was
actually adopted. One might argue that other terms in the revised hypo-
thetical or actual laws are also too vague, but those arguments essen-
tially complain about the inherent ambiguity of language, not the basic
drafting or sentence structure of the laws.
FAPLI challenged the expenditure prohibition and the disclosure
requirements of both statutes on several grounds, including three Florida
constitutional challenges-separation of powers, failure to comply with
requirements for passage of legislation in a special session, and a viola-
tion of the state supreme court's exclusive jurisdiction to regulate law-
yers-and a combined void-for-vagueness and overbreadth challenge
under the U.S. Constitution, relying on the argument that lobbying
amounts to speech and thus implicates a fundamental, First Amendment
right.82
81. Although the FCAT tests rather minimal levels of achievement in elementary and
secondary schools, basic writing skills are required. See, e.g., Joni James, New Law Allows Some
FCAT-Failing Students To Graduate, MIAMI HERALD, June 21, 2003, at 5B; State Sued over
FCAT Graders, MIAMi HERALD, Apr. 25, 2006, at 7B. If nothing else, the controversy and
litigation over these lobbying laws demonstrate the need for solid instruction in the state's schools.
82. Initial Brief of Appellants, supra note 13, at 31-38.
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Leaving aside the state constitutional arguments, as did the Elev-
enth Circuit,83 and focusing on the vagueness and overbreadth argu-
ments, it would appear that these two arguments were largely driven by
the use of the word "indirect" or "indirectly" in two key provisions-
one aimed at disclosure and the other aimed at prohibiting payments to
state officials.84 The essence of this attack boiled down to the following:
(1) The laws rely on "standards that a person of common intelligence"
would not understand; (2) these vague standards, presumably by includ-
ing the use of the word "indirect," "allow for the unbridled discretion"
by the enforcement authorities within the legislative and executive
branches for their respective officials and lobbyists; and (3) the laws
broadly sweep in speech not directly aimed at legislators and other cov-
ered state officials.85 Appellants thus argued the legislature drafted the
statute so poorly that no one could know what the expenditure prohibi-
tion and disclosure requirement covered-resulting in a lack of fair
notice or possible arbitrary enforcement, or both-and that the disclo-
sure requirement could be read broadly to cover speech to the public or
press by a lobbyist that was made on behalf of another, but not for
expressly advocating action by the legislature or other covered state
officials.
III. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT REELS IN VAGUE VAGUENESS
ARGUMENTS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE
CONTEXT OF STATE REGULATION OF LOBBYISTS
The court addressed the FAPLI challenge in two steps. First, it cer-
tified to the Florida Supreme Court the state law questions regarding
state separation of powers, whether the Florida House of Representatives
used the proper procedure for passing the Act during a special session,
and whether the Act, by regulating the lobbying activities of lawyers,
violated the exclusive jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court under
the state constitution to regulate lawyers.86 Second, it addressed substan-
83. Fla. Ass'n of Prof l Lobbyists v. Div. of Legislative Info. Servs., 525 F.3d 1073, 1077-78
(11 th Cir. 2008).
84. FLA. STAT. §§ 11.045(1)(b), 11.045(4)(a), 112.3215(1)(c), 112.3215(6)(a). The latter in
each context is the prohibition of payments of expenditures to the covered officials-subsections
that themselves use these terms. The former in each context is the definition of "compensation,"
which must be plugged into the respective section requiring disclosure. Id. §§ 11.045(3),
112.3215(5). It is these definitions that use the terms "direct" and "indirect."
85. Initial Brief of Appellants, supra note 13, at 31-38.
86. Fla. Ass'n ofProfl Lobbyists, 525 F.3d at 1077-78 (concluding that Florida law was not
sufficiently established for the court to "determine with confidence" the constitutionality of the
Act under the Florida constitution); see also Fla. Ass'n of Prof'l Lobbyists v. Div. of Legislative
Info. Servs., No. SC08-791, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 403 (Fla. Mar. 19, 2009) (rejecting all three state
law challenges and upholding the Act under the Florida Constitution).
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tively the vagueness and overbreadth challenges and rejected both.87
With regard to vagueness the Eleventh Circuit focused on FAPLI's
argument that the use of terms such as "expenditure" or "direct" and
"indirect" left the statutes so poorly defined "that a person of common
intelligence must guess at their meaning and that, as a result, the Act
allows for unbridled discretion in its enforcement."88 The court
addressed the heart of the argument, as well as the most obvious
instance of questionable legislative drafting, by directly looking at the
language of the expenditure prohibition-the language that might appear
to prohibit all expenditures by lobbyists for lobbying as well as the
acceptance of any such funds by state officials. Here the court relied on
the use of the conjunctive "and" to mean as a matter of common sense
that the prohibition applied not to the two activities separately to pro-
hibit both individually and independently of one another, but only to the
two in combination-that is, a prohibition of lobbying expenditures to
state officials.89 Any other interpretation would have been illogical or at
least contrary to common sense. Similarly, the court accepted the use of
the term "indirect" as one that in this context the covered individuals
would understand to "appl[y] to expenditures or compensation paid
through a third party."90
The Eleventh Circuit's analysis of the overbreadth argument of
FAPLI followed a fairly standard path of constitutional analysis, but the
court revealed by its logic that the overbreadth challenge rested in part
on FAPLI's general vagueness argument.9' FAPLI argued that by
requiring disclosure of all expenditures, including indirect expenditures,
the statute swept into its ambit protected speech by lobbyists who were
merely communicating with the public or press, for example, and not
with legislators or other covered state officials.92 Again, while the statu-
tory language could have been clearer, the court deflected this argument
by pointing out that the provision requiring disclosure of all fees and
payments to lobbyists by their clients used the term "compensation,"
which the statute defined to include only those payments, direct or indi-
rect, to a lobbying firm for "lobbying activity," and that the statute also
define "lobbies"-presumably as the root of "lobbying activity"-to
87. Fla. Ass'n of Profl Lobbyists, 525 F.3d at 1078-80.
88. Id. at 1078.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1079.
91. Id.; see also United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1305 (11th Cir. 2006), rev'd on
other grounds, 128 S. Ct. 1830 (2008) (recognizing that, while distinct, the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines are logically related because both often involve interpretation of unclear
language).
92. Initial Brief of Appellants, supra note 13, at 35-37.
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mean seeking to influence the covered state officials in terms of policy
or procurement or to obtain their goodwill. 93
As with much of the vagueness argument, the court's rejection of
the overbreadth argument turned to a significant degree on the interpre-
tation of the term "indirect" and parsing of defined terms. Vague and
convoluted drafting effectively handed FAPLI not one, but two bites at
this apple. In this regard, some linguistic spadework allowed the court to
uncover a definition of "lobbying activity" that limited the disclosure
requirement to efforts to influence the covered officials and not merely
to communicate with the public or press. Once the statute was so con-
fined, it implicated the state's "compelling interest in 'self-protection' in
the face of coordinated pressure campaigns directed by lobbyists" and
thus assured the statute's constitutionality.94 The court thus salvaged the
statute by reading it as a whole and confining its application only to that
which the state had a compelling interest in securing: the disclosure of
payments to lobby state officials either directly or indirectly and the pro-
hibition of payments by lobbyists directly or indirectly to covered state
officials-as well as their knowing acceptance of such payments-for
lobbying purposes.
A comparison of the Eleventh Circuit's vagueness analysis in
FAPLI v. Division with its vagueness analysis in United States v. Wil-
liams,95 which was later reversed, 96 shows even more plainly the impor-
tance of a contextual approach to statutes as a whole when parsing
seemingly vague terms. In Williams, the issue was a federal law directed
at the knowing advertising, promotion, presentation, distribution, or
solicitation of child pornography or, in other words, speech related to
transactions in child pornography.97 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that
the federal law was "not at all clear what [was] meant by promoting or
soliciting material 'in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended
to cause another to believe' that touted or desired material contains ille-
gal child pornography." 98 Noting a heightened concern for clarity in a
criminal statute implicating First Amendment rights, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit concluded this pandering law was so devoid of context that it could
apply to "innocent baby-in-the-bubbles snapshots or candid stills of the
family Rottweiler in a No. 10 washtub" or some "chronic forwarder of
93. Fla. Ass'n of Profl Lobbyists, 525 F.3d at 1079-80.
94. Id. at 1080 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Williams, 444 F.3d at 1305-07.
96. See Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830.
97. See Williams, 444 F.3d at 1288-89. The federal law at issue in Williams was the
pandering provision of the PROTECT Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2006).
98. Williams, 444 F.3d at 1306 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B)).
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cute photos with racy tongue-in-cheek subject lines."99
The Supreme Court, in a seven-to-two decision, disagreed on sev-
eral grounds, not the least of which was the question of any statutory
context that might shed meaning on the restrictions."° Dismissing the
value of unlikely hypothetical cases or imagined close cases that a jury
would resolve by weighing the evidence according to the "requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,"' 0 ' the Court looked for and found
the Eleventh Circuit's missing context because the statute applied only
to those persons who believed, spoke in a manner reflecting a belief, or
intended to cause another to believe that the pictures actually showed
children engaged in "sexually explicit conduct" as defined by the law.' 02
Further, the Court rejected the use of close cases to inject ambiguity in a
statute that is as precise as language will reasonably permit:
What renders a statute vague is not the possibility that it will some-
times be difficult to determine whether the incriminating fact it estab-
lishes has been proved; but rather the indeterminacy of precisely what
that fact is. Thus, we have stuck down statutes that tied criminal cul-
pability to whether the defendant's conduct was "annoying" or "inde-
cent"-wholly subjective judgments without statutory definitions,
narrowing context, or settled legal meanings.'0 3
In other words, the Court concluded the pandering law gave law
enforcement officials no more discretion than did any other law against
"fraud, conspiracy, or solicitation."' 1 4 Having stripped away questions
of fact that might result in close cases for a jury, the Court held the law
taken as a whole was not vague about what or who was covered and thus
not void for vagueness. 0 5
The decisions in Williams and FAPLI v. Division are not inconsis-
tent in terms of the importance of context in determining whether the
inherent ambiguities of statutory language are fatal constitutionally.
Both cases implicated First Amendment rights. Both involved laws with
detailed definitions. Both involved laws that arguably could have been a
99. Id. at 1306-07.
100. Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1846 ("Close cases can be imagined under virtually any statute.").
101. Id.
102. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A) (defining "sexually explicit conduct" as "actual or
simulated-(i) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal,
whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; (ii) bestiality; (iii) masturbation; (iv)
sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any
person").
103. Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1846. Note also the Court's citation of Ward v. Rock Against
Racism for the proposition that "perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required
even of regulations that restrict expressive activity." Id. at 1845 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989)).
104. Id. at 1846.
105. Id.
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bit clearer in writing or structure. The difference was that in Williams
the Eleventh Circuit discounted or dismissed the overall context of the
pandering law by focusing on possible misunderstandings by would-be
innocent senders of cute baby pictures rather than focusing on the more
relevant context of sexually explicit conduct and the intentions of per-
sons who deal or attempt to deal in such material involving children. In
FAPLI v. Division, the Eleventh Circuit found the relevant context: lob-
byists, their principals, the legislature, and other covered state officials
or employees-people who know influence peddling as surely as ped-
dlers of child pornography know sexually explicit conduct.
CONCLUSION
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is a key defense against unfair and
arbitrary laws because the doctrine requires enough legislative clarity to
provide fair notice of the prohibited conduct and to avoid, or at least not
invite, arbitrary enforcement. The doctrine was never meant to be a judi-
cially imposed equivalent of a technical writing examination or basis for
the conjuring of unlikely hypothetical problems that, while imaginable
given the inherent malleability of language, obviously exceed the
express context of a statute. The Eleventh Circuit employed this com-
mon sense approach to the vagueness challenge in FAPLI v. Division by
concluding that a fair reading of the definitions and other sections of the
lobbying laws left no unconstitutional ambiguity about who or what was
covered. Although one might have to read the statutes a few times to be
clear about the meaning, that meaning should be clear to those involved
and would in all likelihood come as no surprise: Lobbyists and their
clients cannot give money or anything of value (directly or indirectly) to
covered officials for the purpose of lobbying, those officials cannot
accept such things from lobbyists or their clients, and lobbying firms
must disclose what they have been paid (directly or indirectly) and by
whom to influence covered state agencies and officials or to obtain their
goodwill. Perhaps the statutes could have been written more eloquently
or clearly, but who ever said legislators need be masters of prose or even
particularly literate? Not the Eleventh Circuit, at least not when it comes
to lobbyists and state officials who ought to know what the legislators
meant.
